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1 ABSTRACT
This article outlines a method for automatically generating models of dynamic decision-making
that both have strong predictive power and are interpretable in human terms. This is useful
for designing empirically grounded agent-based simulations and for gaining direct insight into
observed dynamic processes. We use an efficient model representation and a genetic algorithm-
based estimation process to generate simple approximations that explain most of the structure
of complex stochastic processes. This method, implemented in C++ and R, scales well to large
data sets. We apply our methods to empirical data from human subjects game experiments
∗Copyright © 2015, IEEE.
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and international relations. We also demonstrate the method’s ability to recover known data-
generating processes by simulating data with agent-based models and correctly deriving the
underlying decision models for multiple agent models and degrees of stochasticity.
2 MODEL REPRESENTATION
This article describes a modeling method designed to understand data on dynamic decision-
making. We have created a practical, easy-to-use software package implementing the method.
Although our method is more broadly applicable, the motivation for the model representation
was prediction of individual behavior in strategic interactions, i.e. games. Most behavioral
game-theoretic treatments of repeated games use action-learning models that specify the way
in which attractions to actions are updated by an agent as play progresses [Camerer, 2003].
Action learning models can perform poorly at predicting behavior in games where cooperation
(e.g. Prisoner’s Dilemma) or coordination (e.g. Bach or Stravinsky) are key [Hanaki, 2004].
Also, they often fail to account for the effects of changes in information and player matching
conditions [McKelvey and Palfrey, 2001]. In this paper, we model repeated game strategies
as decision-making procedures that can explicitly consider the dynamic nature of the environ-
ment, e.g. if my opponent cooperated last period then I will cooperate this period. We represent
decision-making with finite-state machines and use a genetic algorithm to estimate the values
of the state transition tables. This combination of representation and optimization allows us to
efficiently and effectively model dynamic decision-making.
Traditional game theories define strategies as complete contingent plans that specify how a
player will act in every possible state; however, when the environment becomes even moderately
complex the number of possible states of the world can grow beyond the limits of human cog-
nition [Miller, 1996, Fudenberg et al., 2012]. One modeling response to cognitive limitations
has been to exogenously restrict the complexity of repeated game strategies by representing
them as Moore machines – finite state machines whose outputs depend only on their current
state [Moore, 1956] – with a small number of states [Rubinstein, 1986, Miller, 1996, Hanaki
et al., 2005]. Moore machines can model bounded rationality, explicitly treating procedures of
decision-making [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994]. A machine modeling agent i responding to
the actions of agent j is a four-tuple [Qi,q0i , fi,τi], where Qi is the set of states, q0i ∈ Qi is the
initial state, fi : Qi→ Ai is the output function mapping a state to an action, and τi : Qi×A j→Qi
(where j 6= i) is the transition function mapping a state and another agent’s action to a state
[Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994]. We generalize this model beyond games by allowing for more
inputs in τi than A j, and by providing empirical rankings of these inputs that can be used to
induce sparsity in more context-rich environments. The Moore machine can have many under-
lying states for a single observable action, allowing it to represent arbitrarily complex decision
processes. The complexity is directly controlled by the number of states, which is a tuning
parameter of our method that can be optimized by Algorithm 2 for predictive performance.
Fig. 1 shows examples of finite state machines (FSMs) representing strategies for the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see Section 4 for game details): The possible states are cooperate (C)
and defect (D), and after initialization the current state is determined by the history of the player
and her opponent cooperating or defecting (cc, cd, dc, dd) in the previous period.
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Cstart D
cd
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(a) Tit-for-tat.
Cstart D
cd
cc all
(b) Grim trigger.
C1start C2 D
cd
cc
cd
cc dc
dd
(c) Tit-for-two-tat.
Figure 1: Game theoretic strategies represented as finite state machines [Rubinstein, 1986,
Miller, 1996, Fudenberg et al., 2012]. Lower-case letters denote the possible outcomes
of the previous period of play, e.g. cd means the player cooperated and her opponent
defected.
3 ESTIMATION
Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been used to model agents updating beliefs based on endoge-
nously determined variables in a general equilibrium environment [Bullard and Duffy, 1999],
and agents learning to make economic decisions [Arifovic, 1994, Arifovic and Eaton, 1995,
Marks et al., 1995, Midgley et al., 1997]. In contrast to investigations of GAs as models of agent
learning and behavior, we use GAs to automatically generate interpretable agent decision models
from empirical data. This is similar to work by Fogel [1993], Miller [1996], and Miller and Page
[2007], in which GAs evolved FSMs based on their interactions with one another in simulated
games, but whereas these were theoretical exercises, we are estimating models to explain and
predict observed interactions among real agents. We use GAs as optimization routines for esti-
mation because they perform well in rugged search spaces to quickly solve discrete optimization
problems, are a natural complement to our binary string representation of FSMs [Goldberg and
Holland, 1988], and are easily parallelized.
Duffy and Engle-Warnick [2002] combined empirical experimental data with genetic pro-
gramming (GP) to model behavior. GP, with the same genetic operations as most GAs [Koza,
1992], is a process that can evolve arbitrary computer programs [Duffy, 2006]. We apply genetic
operations to FSM representations rather than to all predictor variables and functional primitives
because we are interested in deriving decision models with a particular structure: FSMs with
latent states, rather than models conditioning on observable variables with any arbitrary func-
tional form. With data-driven modeling, it is desirable to impose as many constraints as can be
theoretically justified on the functional form of the model (see Miller and Page [2007] for inter-
esting theoretical results related to FSM agents interacting in games). This avoids overfitting by
constraining the model to a functional form that is likely generalizable across contexts, allows
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genetic selection to converge better, and reduces the computational effort required to explore pa-
rameter space. An additional challenge in implementing GP is specifying the genetic operations
on the function primitives while ensuring that they will always produce syntactically valid pro-
grams that represent meaningful decision models. This requires fine-tuning to specific problems,
which we avoid because we are designing a general method applicable across domains.
Our choice to use Moore machines as the building blocks of our decision modeling method
ensures that estimation will produce easily interpretable models with latent states that can be rep-
resented graphically (see Fig. 1 for examples). Our process represents Moore machines as Gray-
encoded binary strings consisting of an action vector followed by elements that form the state
matrix Savage [1997]. For details, see Fig. 3a and our build_bitstring, decode_action_vec,
and decode_stat_mat functions. This way, genetic operators can have free reign to search the
global parameter space guided by the ability to predict provided data with the decoded binary
strings.
Data: Time series of actions taken by agents and the relevant predictors of each action.
Result: Finite state machine (FSM) with highest predictive performance.
Set convergence criteria (maximum number of generations or number of generations
without improvement in performance of best FSM) based on the number of parameters
to estimate;
Create initial population at step k = 0 of p individuals {θ 01 ,θ 02 , ...,θ 0p} (FSMs, encoded
as binary strings);
while convergence not satisfied do
Decode each individual’s string into an FSM, evaluate its predictive performance on
training data, and set this as the individual’s fitness for step k, f (θ ki );
Assign each individual a probability for selection proportional to its fitness,
pki ∝ f (θ ki );
Select individuals by sampling from the population with replacement;
Create next generation, {θ k+11 ,θ k+12 , ...,θ k+1p }, by applying random crossover and
mutation to the selected sub-population;
end
Return argmaxθ ki f (θ
k
i ): the individual with the greatest predictive power;
Check each element of the solution’s state transition matrix for contribution to predictive
performance, and evaluate solution on test data, if supplied.
Algorithm 1: Evolving finite state machines with a genetic algorithm.
The vast majority of computation time for Algorithm 1 is the evaluation of the predictive
accuracy of the FSMs (not the stochastic generation of candidate FSMs). To improve perfor-
mance we implement this evaluation in C++ using the Rcpp package [Eddelbuettel, 2013], and,
because it is embarrassingly parallel, distribute it across processor cores. We have incorporated
our code into an R package with an API of documented function calls and using the GA package
[Scrucca, 2013] to perform the GA evolution. A user can generate an optimized FSM by calling
evolve_model(data), where data is an R data.frame object with columns representing the
time period of the decision, the decision taken at that period, and any predictor variables. There
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are many additional optional arguments to this evolve_model function, but they have sensible
default values. Our package then generates C++ code for a fitness function and uses it to eval-
uate automatically generated candidate models. Once the convergence criteria of this iterative
search process is satisfied, the best FSM is identified, and each predictor variable is assessed
by checking its identifiability and computing its importance in that decision model. The return
value contains a descriptive summary of all results, including those shown in Fig. 3.
The number of states in the FSM and the number of predictor variables to include are hyper-
parameters that control the complexity of the model. Beginning with the simplest possible model
and increasing complexity by adding states and variables, we often observe that at first, out-
of-sample predictive accuracy grows because bias falls more quickly than variance rises; but
eventually, adding further complexity reduces bias less than it increases variance so accuracy
decreases [Hastie et al., 2009]. We can use cross-validation on the training data to find values
for the hyper-parameters that maximize predictive accuracy (Algorithm 2). We assess the out-
of-sample predictive accuracy of the final model with a hold-out test set of data, distinct from the
cross-validation test-sets in Algorithm 2. Increasing complexity to optimize predictive accuracy
introduces a new trade-off because more complex decision models are harder to interpret in
human terms, so the “best” solution will depend on the goals of the analysis.
Data: A dataset, a performance metric (e.g. accuracy or area under the ROC curve), and
possible hyper-parameter values (e.g. number of states or predictor variables to
include).
Result: An estimate of the hyper-parameters that lead to best predictive performance.
for each row in design matrix of hyper-parameter sets do
Sample data into k (e.g., 10) groups;
for each k do
Set group k as a testing set and everything else as a training set;
Evolve model on training set with Algorithm 1;
Predict testing set and compare to actual values based on performance metric;
end
Calculate average performance across all predictions on all k testing sets;
end
Return hyper-parameter set with best average performance;
Algorithm 2: Use cross-validation to optimize FSM hyper-parameters for predictive per-
formance.
4 EXPERIMENTAL GAME DATA
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is often used as a model of cooperation [Axelrod, 1984].
A one-shot PD game has a unique equilibrium in which each player chooses to defect even
though both players would be better off if they cooperated. Suppose two players play the
simultaneous-move PD game in Fig. 2, observe the choice of the other person, and then play the
same simultaneous-move game again. Even in the (finitely) repeated version, no cooperation
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C D
C (3,3) (0,4)
D (4,0) (1,1)
Figure 2: Payoff table for a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. C is cooperate and D is defect.
can be achieved by rational income maximizers. This tension between maximizing collective
and individual gain is representative of a broad class of social situations (e.g. the “tragedy of the
commons” [Hardin, 1968]).
We applied our procedure to data from laboratory experiments on human subjects playing
IPD games for real financial incentives. Nay [2014] gathered and integrated data from many ex-
periments, conducted and analyzed by Bereby-Meyer and Roth [2006], Duffy and Ochs [2009],
Kunreuther et al. [2009], Dal Bo and Frechette [2011] and Fudenberg et al. [2012]. All of the
experiments share the same underlying repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, although the de-
tails of the games differed. Nay’s data set comprises 135,388 cooperation decisions, which is
much larger than previous studies of repeated game strategies.
Fudenberg et al. [2012] and Dal Bo and Frechette [2011] modeled their IPD experimental data
with repeated game strategies; however, they applied a maximum likelihood estimation process
to estimate the prevalence of a relatively small predefined set of strategies. In contrast, our
estimation process automatically searches through a very large parameter space that includes all
possible strategies up to a given number of states and does not require the analyst to predefine
any strategies, or even understand the game.
We used 80% of our data for training and reserved the other 20% as a hold-out test set. Fig. 3
shows different representations of the the fittest two-state machine of a GA population evolved
on the training data: The raw Gray-encoded and binary string (Fig. 3a), the bitstring decoded
into state matrix and action vector form (Fig. 3b), and the corresponding graph representation
(Fig. 3c). We measure variable importance (Fig. 3d) by switching each value of an estimated
model’s state matrix to another value in its feasible range, measuring the decrease in goodness
of fit to the training data, normalizing the values, then summing across each column to estimate
the relative importance of each predictor variable (in this case, the moves each player made in
the previous turn).
Fig. 4 illustrates the GA run that evolved the FSM of Fig. 3 by predicting cooperation deci-
sions in IPD training data games. This GA run, which only took a few seconds on a modest
laptop, used common algorithm settings: a population of 175 FSMs initialized with random
bitstrings. If the analyst has an informed prior belief about the subjects’ decision models, she
can initialize the population with samples drawn from that prior distribution, but this paper fo-
cuses on deriving useful results from random initializations, corresponding to uniform priors,
where the analyst only provides data. A linear-rank selection process used the predictive abil-
ity of individuals to select a subset of the population from which to create the next generation.
A single-point crossover process was applied to the binary values of selected individuals with
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raw string: 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
encoded av, sm: 0, 1 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
decoded av, sm: 0, 1 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1
(a) Raw string; string split into Gray-
encoded action vector (av) and state ma-
trix (sm); and decoded binary represen-
tations. Decoded sm consists of column-
wise elements that index into the action
vector to determine the action for each
state.
Action vector: 1, 2
State matrix:
State cc dc cd dd
C (1) 1 2 2 2
D (2) 1 2 2 2
(b) Bitstring decoded into action vector and
state matrix. For this action vector, 1
corresponds to cooperation (C) and 2 to
defection (D). Columns of state matrix
correspond to the observed behaviors at
t−1 and rows correspond to the state.
Cstart D
cd, dc, dd
cc
cc
cd, dc, dd
(c) Corresponding graph representation.
cc
cd
dc
dd
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(d) Relative variable importance. Most im-
portant is 100.
Figure 3: A finite state machine estimated on 108,305 decisions with 82% accuracy on a hold-
out test data set of 27,083 decisions. Transitions that would be accessible in strictly
deterministic play are represented in boldface and inaccessible transitions in italic.
Because the human players did not follow exact deterministic strategies, and the itali-
cized transitions were taken in simulating this model with actual game play, the values
of these transitions were identifiable.
0.8 probability, uniform random mutation was conducted with probability 0.1, and the top 5%
fittest individuals survived each generation without crossover or mutation, ensuring that poten-
tially very good solutions would not be lost [Scrucca, 2013]. These are standard GA parameter
settings and can be adjusted if convergence is taking particularly long for a given dataset.
Using theoretical agent-based simulations and a fitness measure that is a function of simulated
payoffs, Axelrod [1997] demonstrated the fitness of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. Using a fitness
measure that is a function of the ability to explain human behavior, we discovered a hybrid of
TFT and grim trigger (GT), which we call noisy grim (NG). TFT’s state is determined solely by
the opponent’s last play. GT will never exit a defecting state, no matter what the opponent does.
With traditional repeated game strategies such as TFT and GT, the player always takes the
action corresponding to her current state (boldface transitions in Fig. 3c), but if we add noise to
decisions so the player will sometimes choose the opposite action from her current state (italic
transitions in Fig. 3c), then the possibility arises for both the player and opponent to cooperate
when the player is in the defecting state (i.e. to reach the second row first column position of the
state matrix in Fig. 3b). This would return the player to the cooperating state (see, e.g., Chong
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Figure 4: Proportion of correct predictions of human decisions in IPD games by an evolving
population of decision models (strategies). On average, a random choice strategy will
have 50% accuracy. Shaded area is the difference between the median of the popula-
tion of strategies and the best individual strategy.
and Yao [2005]). Noisy grim’s predictions on the hold-out test data are 82% accurate, GT’s are
72% accurate, and TFT’s are 77% accurate. We also tested 16 other repeated game strategies
for the IPD from [Fudenberg et al., 2012]. Their accuracy on the test set ranged from 46% to
77%. Our method uncovered a deterministic dynamic decision model that predicts IPD play
better than all of the existing theoretical automata models of IPD play that we are aware of and
has interesting relationships to the two most well-known models: TFT and GT.
This process has allowed us to estimate a highly interpretable decision model (fully repre-
sented by the small image of Fig. 3c) that predicts most of the behavior of hundreds of human
participants, merely by plugging in the dataset as input. We address the potential concern that
the process is too tuned to this specific case study by inputting a very different dataset from the
field of international relations and obtaining useful results. However, before moving to more em-
pirical data—where the data-generating process can never be fully known—to test how robustly
we can estimate a known model, we repeatedly simulate a variety of known data-generating
mechanisms and then apply the method to the resulting choice data.
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5 SIMULATED DATA
In the real world, people rarely strategically interact by strictly following a deterministic strat-
egy [Chong and Yao, 2005]. Whimsy, strategic randomization, or error may induce a player to
choose a different move from the one dictated by her strategy. To study whether our method
could determine an underlying strategy that an agent would override from time to time, we fol-
lowed the approach of Fudenberg et al. [2012] and created an agent-based model of the IPD in
which agents followed deterministic strategies, such as TFT and GT, but made noisy decisions:
At each time period, the deterministic strategy dictates each agent’s preferred action, but the
agent will choose the opposite action with probability p, where p ranges from 0 (perfectly de-
terministic play) to 0.5 (completely random play). The noise parameter, p, is constant across all
states of a strategy of a particular agent for any given simulation experiment we conducted.
When a player follows an unknown strategy, characterized by latent states, discovering the
strategy (the actions corresponding to each state and transitions between the states) requires
observed data that explores as much as possible of the state transition matrix defined by all
possible combinations of state and predictor values (for these strategies the predictors are the
history of play). Many deterministic strategy pairings can quickly reach equilibria in which
players repeat the same moves for the rest of the interaction. If the player and opponent both use
TFT and both make the same first move, every subsequent move will repeat the first move. If the
opponent plays GT, then after the first time the player defects the opponent will defect for the rest
of the session and the data will provide little information on the player’s response to cooperation
by the opponent. However, if the opponent plays with noise, the play will include many instances
of cooperation and defection by the opponent, and will thus sample the accessible state space for
the player’s strategy more thoroughly than if the opponent plays deterministically. Indeed, this is
why Fudenberg et al. [2012] added noise to action choices in their human subjects experimental
games.
We simulated approximately 17 million interactions, varying paired decision models of each
agent [(TFT, TFT), (TFT, GT), (GT, TFT), (GT, GT)] and also varying the noise parameter p
(0, 0.025, ... , 0.5) for each of two noise conditions: where both players made equally noisy
decisions, and where only the opponent made noisy decisions while the player under study
strictly followed a deterministic strategy. We ran 25 replicates of each of the 168 experimental
conditions, with 4,000 iterations of game play for each replicate, and then applied the FSM
estimation method to each replicate of the simulated choice data to estimate the strategy that the
agent player under study was using.
Being in state/row k (e.g. 2) corresponds to the player taking action k (e.g. D) in the current
turn. All entries in row k corresponding to the player taking action k in the current period
(e.g. columns 2 and 4 for D) are identifiable. Entries in row k that correspond to not taking action
k in the current period (e.g. columns 1 and 3 for row 2) represent transitions that cannot occur
in strictly deterministic play, so their values cannot affect play and thus cannot be determined
empirically. We take this into account when testing the method’s ability to estimate underlying
deterministic models: this is why only 6 elements of a 10-element TFT or GT matrix can be
identified (Fig. 5). We also take this into account when estimating models from empirical data,
where the data-generating process is assumed to be stochastic: each element of the matrix that
would be inaccessible under deterministic play is identified, and the fitness is calculated with a
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(a) Effect of decision models and noise in choice on ability to estimate true model when a noisy
player faces an equally noisy opponent. Color indicates the pair of decision models used
by the player and opponent. For noise probabilities between 0.025 and 0.325 the estimated
model always exactly matches the true model.
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(b) Comparison of a purely deterministic player facing a noisy opponent versus a noisy player
facing a noisy opponent. As noise approaches 0.5, the decision model’s impact on actual
choices vanishes, so the model error rises sharply when the player’s decisions are noisy.
Figure 5: Role of noise in correctly identifying the player’s strategy. Points have been jittered
for visualization. Lines are LOESS-curves. Noise represents the probability, in any
period, that an agent will take the opposite action from its decision model. Both the GT
and TFT strategies can be represented as a 10 element matrix, of which 6 elements have
identifiable values. The model error represents the number of mismatched elements
between the estimated and true matrices, so it ranges from 0 (best) to 6 (worst).
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strategy matrix in which that element is changed to its complement (“flipped”). If flipping the
element does not change the fitness, then the two complementary strategies are indistinguishable
and the element in question cannot be determined empirically. If each element decreases the
fitness when it is flipped, then the strategy corresponds to a deterministic approximation of a
stochastic process and all of the elements of the state matrix can be identified.
When the noise parameter was zero, most of the models estimated by the GA had at least
two incorrect elements. However, for moderate amounts of noise (p = 0.025–0.325), all of the
models estimated by the GA were correct (see Fig. 5a). For noise levels above p = 0.325 in the
player, the amount of error rose rapidly with p, as expected because at p = 0.5 the action the
player chooses moves completely at random so there is no strategy to discover. When a strictly
deterministic player faced a noisy opponent, the GA correctly identified the player’s strategy for
all noise levels above p = 0.025 (see Fig. 5b).
6 OBSERVATIONAL DATA
In order to extend this method to more complex situations the predictor variables (columns of the
state matrices) can include any time-varying variable relevant to an agent’s decision. In context-
free games such as the IPD, the only predictor variables are the moves the players made in
the previous turn, but models of strategic interactions in context-rich environments may include
other relevant variables.
We find it difficult to interpret graphical models with more than four predictors, but an analyst
who had many potentially relevant predictor variables and was unable to use theory alone to
reduce the number of predictors sufficiently to generate easily interpretable models with our
method could take four courses of action (listed in order of increasing reliability and computation
time):
1. Before FSM estimation, apply a (multivariate or univariate) predictor variable selection
method.
2. Before FSM estimation, estimate an arbitrary predictive model that can produce variable
importance rankings and then use the top p < 4 predictors for FSM estimation.
3. After FSM estimation with p ≥ 4 predictors, inspect the returned predictor variable im-
portance ranking, and remove all but the top p < 4 from her dataset and re-run estimation.
4. Conduct FSM estimation with all combinations of p < 4 predictors out of all relevant
predictors and choose the estimated model with the best performance (usually highest
out-of-sample accuracy).
We illustrate the use of extra predictor variables by applying our method to an example from
international relations involving repeated water management-related interactions between coun-
tries that share rivers. We use data compiled by Brochmann [2012] on treaty signing and cooper-
ation over water quality, water quantity, and flood control from 1948–1999 to generate a model
for predicting whether two countries will cooperate. We used three lagged variables: whether
there was water-related conflict between them in the previous year, whether they cooperated
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(b) Relative variable importance for two-state
model. Most important is 100.
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(c) Three-state model.
Figure 6: Models of cooperation over water issues for sets of countries. The italicized transitions
would not be feasible outcomes if this strategy was played deterministically, but they
are realized in the data. The inputs (c,nc) represent cooperation and non-cooperation,
respectively; (f,nf) conflict and non-conflict; and (t,nt) signing and not signing a treaty.
around water in the previous year, and whether they had signed a water-related treaty during
any previous year. This data set was too small to divide into training and hold-out subsets for
assessing predictive accuracy, so we report models’ accuracy in reproducing the training data (a
random choice model is 50% accurate). A two-state decision model (Fig. 6a) is 73% accurate,
a three-state model (Fig. 6c) is 78% accurate, and a four-state model is 82% accurate, but its
complexity makes it difficult to interpret visually so it is not shown.
Accuracy can be a problematic measure when the classes are imbalanced, i.e. if a class the
model is trying to predict is rare. Many alternatives to accuracy are available that illuminate
different aspects of predictive power. For instance, precision is the proportion of (cooperation)
event signals predicted by our models that are correct and recall is the proportion of events that
are predicted by our models. For this subset of the dataset, cooperate and not cooperate were
almost evenly distributed and to maintain a comparison to the experimental and simulated data
we used accuracy as the fitness measure.
In the two-state model, whether or not the countries cooperated in the previous year, the
combination of conflict and treaty-signing in the previous year always produces cooperation,
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whereas conflict without treaty-signing in the previous year always produces non-cooperation.
In the three-state model, three of the four outcomes that include conflict lead to a transition
from non-cooperation to cooperation, and four of the six outcomes that cause transitions from
cooperation (states C1 and C2) to non-cooperation are non-conflict outcomes. While this does
not tell us something decisive about the role of conflict, it suggests that there may be a counter-
intuitive role of conflict in promoting cooperation. Brochmann [2012], using a bivariate probit
simultaneous equation model, has a similar finding: “In the aftermath of conflict, states may be
particularly eager to solve important issues that could cause future problems” (p. 159).
7 DISCUSSION
This paper outlined a method for estimating interpretable models of dynamic decision-making.
By estimating a global, deterministic, simple function for a given dataset, imposing constraints
on the number of predictor variables, and providing options for reducing the number of predictor
variables, our process facilitates capturing a significant amount of information in a compact and
useful form. The method can be used for designing empirically grounded agent models in agent-
based simulations and for gaining direct insight into observed behaviors of real agents in social
and physical systems. Combining state matrices and a genetic algorithm has proven effective for
simulated data, experimental game data, and observational international relations data. With the
simulated data, we successfully recovered the exact underlying models that generated the data.
With the real data, we estimated simple deterministic approximations that explain most of the
structure of the unknown underlying process. We discovered a theoretically interesting dynamic
decision model that predicted IPD play better than all of the existing theoretical models of IPD
play that we were aware of.
We have released an open-source R package that implements the methods described here
to estimate any time series classification model that uses a small number of binary predictor
variables and moves back and forth between the values of the outcome variable over time. Larger
sets of predictor variables can be reduced to smaller sets by applying one of the four methods
outlined in Section 6. Although the predictor variables must be binary, a quantitative variable can
be converted into binary by division of the observed values into high/low classes. Future releases
of the package may include additional estimation methods to complement GA optimization.
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